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VITORIA'S UNIVERSALISM
AND THE
WORLD RULE OF LAW t
THOMAS C. DONOHUE, S.J.*

TWO
CLUSTERS OF MEANING now attach to the term, "the world
rule of law." One may use the expression to indicate the concern
and the movement which had its origin in the work of The International
Commission of Jurists.' In this sense, the movement aims to promote the
recognition of each person's right to full and equal treatment under law
in his own country and within that country's boundaries. The correction
of legal disqualifications is the explicit purpose of this movement. A
second, and older, aim is indicated by the same phrase, and turns upon
the creation or improvement of a juridical order among nations. To
some extent, all movements for some type of "world organization" belong
2
to the second sense of the term.

tThis essay is an extension of remarks made in a luncheon addressbefore members
of the Saint Thomas More Society on the occasion of its meeting in Saint Louis,
Missouri, on December 29, 1959.

*Formerly Editor of the MooEN SCHOOLMAN and the JESUIT BULLETIN and for
many years Vice President of Saint Louis University.
1 The specialized mission of the International Commission of Jurists is evident in
their publications. See BULL. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS No. 7 (1957). "lOin the
whole lawyers who are concerned to defend the Rule of Law think in terms of
national systems of law rather than in terms of international law. But in fact the
struggle for human rights is necessarily conducted simultaneously on two levels ......
Id. at 3.
2 See VON SCRUSCHNIGG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 335-423 (1959) for a recent survey
of various plans for "world organization."
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With the first meaning, this paper will
not deal except tangentially. So far as the
second is concerned, an effort will be made
to show that the theologico-philosophical
legal theory of Francisco de Vitoria has
much to suggest to all who are interested
in re-conceiving and rebuilding the structure of international law. 3 -Implied, of
course, is the notion that however old or
however embryonic the Vitorian position
may be, it may still serve as a sharp knife
to cut through the historical and legal
jungle of the past four hundred years.
The wheel of history is a cruel laboratory. In it are worked out the harshest implications of once proud ideas. What the
human intelligence cannot foresee at the
birth of a system of thought becomes clear
as time involves human beings, their welfare, and their sorrow. And so it is with
political and legal thinking. The stretch
of centuries makes clearer than any speculation the primal truth of international jurisprudence as we have known it. A review
of Vitoria's thought will lend proof to these
generalizations.
With respect to our problem, it may be
well to remember that writers as profoundly
schooled in political and legal history as
the Brothers Carlyle took time to point out
that much of modern legal thought is an
imitation and representative of some of the
worst features of antecedent theory. In
particular, they direct attention to concepts
of law, law-making, and'of sovereignty. As
Vitoria was a Spanish Dominican who spent the
most fruitful period of his life as a professor of
theology at the University of Salamanca. It is
well known that many consider him as one of the
founders, if not the founder, of international law.
He was born in 1483 (?) and died in 1546. For
selections from his works, see CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW No. 7 (Carnegie Endowment,
1917).
3

a matter of fact, they have little admiration
for the reflections of Hobbes. And when
it is recalled that much Anglo-American
jurisprudence derives from Austin, the importance of their observation takes on additional significance. Austin explicitly looked
to Hobbes, Locke, and Paley5 for much of
his inspiration. At least on a practical level,
a great deal of thinking about international
law stems from the kind of mentality which
Austin represented.
Most of the fundamental problems associated with the general question of international society and international law have
been high lighted for the American public
by the recent effort of the Eisenhower administration to secure repeal of the Connally Amendment., As late as December
of last year (1959), the President emphasized his own position when he stated,
that "the time has come for mankind to
make the role of law in international affairs
as normal as it is now in domestic affairs."
Still stressing his affirmative stand, he remarked that "one foundation stone in this
structure is the International Court of
Justice," and he pointed out that a world
4 6 CARLYLE & CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST (1936):

"We have seen in earlier volumes that the political principles of the Middle Ages were clear and
intelligible.. . . It is very different when we come
to some of the political ideas of the seventeenth
century; it is difficult to say which seems to us
most irrational: the absurdity of the theory of the
divine right of the monarch, or the absurdity of
the theory of the absolute sovereignty of the
State as represented by Hobbes." Id. at 1.
5See Hart, Introduction to AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE

OF

JURISPRUDENCE

DETERMINED

Xvi-xvii

(1954).
6 The Connally Amendment provides that matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States shall be "determined by
the United States." See United States Declaration
of Aug. 16, 1946, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 452
(1946).
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body of law must embody "the finest traditions of all the great legal systems of the
7
world."
By now, of course, all effort to repeal the
Amendment has been lost, at least for the
current session of Congress. But the discussion which has surrounded the effort referred to reveals how deep (and how
dangerous) is the sentiment regarding any
full-fledged entry of the United States into
a universal juridical order.
Negative discussion has called the President's policy an "effort at legal disarmament," and a "sellout to Communism." It
is, say the protagonists of this view, "a
dangerous time for internationalism." In
effect, this camp sticks fast to the notion
that the United States cannot and must not
"abdicate her sovereignty." More sober
opinion has insisted that the United States
(or any other state) has protection enough
in the Charter of the Court. This latter
group has pointed out that the American
reservation, as represented in the Connally
Amendment, has given the world "bad example." In effect, they claim, the American
government has agreed to accept the jurisdiction of the Court, but has nullified its
own consent. In so doing, example and
precedent have led other countries to do
the same thing.
Aside from the prudential aspects of
this question, it must be noted that whole
batteries of assumptions underlie both sides
of the discussion. It appears, in fact, that
these assumptions are those which challenge the potential structure of any conception or plan for a "world rule of law."
If one were to assume for a moment that

a non-professional (or non-legal) mind
were completely conversant with international law during the period from its rise to
the present day, he would find that virtually every aspect of this legal system, as
we know it, would be declared open for
questioning. This hypothetical "public
member" would challenge the term itself.
What philosophical and legal value does
the principle of nationality have? One that
is factual or sociological? Is its value anything more than this? Again, in what sense
is international law called "law"? From
writings of jurists, one would see that an
effort is made to restrict the term merely
to man-made or positive law. Worse still,
it appears that "law-making" rides along
on the analogy of municipal law as it is
8
known in the modern world.
At bottom, it would appear to the "public member" that international law is being
victimized by its history and by the mentality which has provided the intellectual
environment of its rise and growth. If the
fundamental assumption of the "family of
nations" is the principle of nationality,
then little can be done to create a legal
system which transcends this principle. If
"law-making" coincides in meaning with
legislative law, then it is nothing short of
miraculous that there is anything like international law at all. When "law" is restricted
to positive law and to this alone, a farewell
is said to anything but a juridical structure
which ignores the most necessary elements
of its purpose: human persons, man-asfound, and inter-personal relationships.
In short, international law as we know
it has grown up in a period when state-

7 These brief quotations from President Eisen-

8 See FINCH, THE SOURCES OF MODERN INTERNA-

hower are taken from various press dispatches, all
dating from December, 1959.

TIONAL

LAW 44-45 (1937) for some pertinent remarks on the matter of non-legislative law.
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craft is based on national interest (in a
very narrow sense), when law has become
simply and solely positive law. One may
point, of course, to the contributions which
"natural law" has allegedly made, but
much of this natural law has been vitiated
by a voluntarism which rests upon an
epistemological theory separated from objective principles. This combination of
themes has become manifest in theories of
legal sovereignty which view sovereignty,
itself, as a kind of subjective attribute of a
person, or a body of persons, or of a state.
Implied in this view is the further assumption that law-making is a subjective right
of the same person, groups of persons, or
a state. So conceived, legislation means
only one kind of legislation. Inherent in
this notion is the further idea that there
is necessarily a superior-subject relationship involved in law. Since this is the case,
one would find it impossible to have a view
where a "sovereign power" could be anything else but supreme. "Supreme power
limited by positive law," as Austin said, "is
a flat contradiction in terms." 9
It will be the business of this paper to
challenge many of the fundamental suppositions inherent in the historical mentality
within which international law has grown
up and on which it now depends. This challenge will take the form of an examination
of a set of Vitorian themes. These may be
stated as follows:
1. Each individual member of the human race is so constituted that he has basic
needs and fundamental capacities. None of
these may be satisfied or met except within
the fellowship of other men.
2. In the sense indicated, each person
is not only competent for and inclined to-

9 AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 254.

ward societal living, but, since he and his
fellows are existent, he is, de facto, a member of society.
3. Since this society is made up of persons (members) who are so constituted
and who really exist, there obtains between
and among these persons a complex set of
real relationships, which are not brought
into being by legislation or any affirmative
act of human construction whatever.
4. All existing persons are, ipso facto,
members of this society, and their membership is inveterate and unchangeable.
5. Mankind, however, is not, by itself,
sufficient for all purposes of human existence. An organized grouping must take
place, and both the grouping and the organization are justified, functionally, by
the same human purposes which men are
expected to achieve in their primitive relationship with other men.
6. In effect, the "state" is necessary in
the same sense that human fellowship and
participation (consortium) is, except that
it fulfills purposes which man alone or
mankind simply as an existent society cannot fulfill. 0
7. In point of fact, however, what one
finds in the world is not the "state" as
such. What one finds is a plurality or a
multiplicity of states.
8. Admittedly, each individual state has
its own functional role to fulfill. Yet, this
function or purpose is not isolated from
the good or the welfare of human society itself. If this is so, then the good of each
individual state and of all its members are,
10 It is difficult to convey an exact meaning for the
word consortium. Basically, it has the notion of a
common sharing of fate, destiny, or condition.
The word can mean many things: fellowship,
mutual commerce between and among persons, a
living together. Every meaning conveys the idea
of a mutual sharing.
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in some ways, subordinated to the good
of the whole human race.
9. If these major theses are true, then
one is in the presence of a situation where
human society as such is interrelated and,
even, organic. The power and the rights
of individual states are related and subordinate to the functional role of human
society as a whole. And just as the necessary g9vernmental structure of a state
serves as the organ for securing that state's
own good, so in like manner, the "family
of states" serve and must serve the same
11
role for all of mankind.
10. If these general theorems are admitted, a role may be found for a jus
gentium which will be the law of mankind.
It will be a positive law, but brought into
being by the consent of the greater part of
the human race (expressed, ordinarily,
through its organs).
This list of themes will appear to be quite
formidable, as indeed it is. Patience will be
required, as well as an effort to keep
Vitorian terms from sliding easily into
categories of thought with which we have
12
become all too familiar.
The Universal Society of Mankind
The starting point of any fresh look at
Vitoria's thought must be his early work
11 For many suggestions on the organic nature of

the state, I am indebted to the section on Vitoria
in DELOS, LA SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE ET LES
PRINCIPES DU DROIT (Paris, 1929).
12 In general, I do not intend to burden this essay
with extensive notes. Brief citations will, refer the
reader to various places in Vitoria's works. The
interested student will find authoritative treatments of Vitoria's thought in CASASSA, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF FRANCISCO DE VITORIA (1946)

(unpublished doctoral dissertation in University

of Toronto Library);
NATIONALE

SCOTT, THE SPANISH
LAW

(1934).

DELOS, LA SOCIETE INTER-

ET LES PRINCIPES fu DROIT

(1929);.
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13
On the Civil Power (De potestate civili).
Here he is not occupied primarily with any
philosophical theory of the state as such.
He is interested in the public and private
power (potestas) by which a state governs
itself. As did practically every man of his
time, Vitoria takes the position that the
nature and kind of power must be derived
from an examination of the purpose which
the power in question is expected to subserve. In effect, then, Vitoria first approaches his topic from the point of view of
finality, a notion which he breaks down
into the subsidiary ideas of utility and use14
fulness.
So posed, the Spaniard's problem then
becomes: which are the purposes or what
is the purpose because of which the civil
power exists at all? What necessity does it
serve? To reply to these generic questions,
he proceeds to move his thought through
four steps or moments: (a) a statement of
the natural condition of all animal existence, except man; (b) an examination of
the natural and inveterate condition of
humankind; (c) the need which each person has of the fellowship of other human
beings; (d) the conclusion that from the
considerations at hand, there is a society
which exists among all human beings. 15
Men in particular and mankind in general are superior to all other animals. This
superiority arises because of man's reason,

13 On the Civil Power (De potestate civili) in Ii
GETINO, RELECCIONES TEOLOGICAS DEL MAESTRO
FRAY FRANCISCO DE VITORIA 169-210 (Madrid,

1933) (edici6n critica y versi6n castellana) [hereinafter cited as GETINO]. All textual' references
will be given to this edition.
14 See GETINO 175-79 for Vitoria's treatment of
finality in relation to the civil power.
15 The reader will recognize here the familiar general movement of the Aristotelian theory of the
basis of the Greek city-state.
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wisdom, and power of speech. Yet, despite
this evidence of superiority, man has been
denied many things which nature and Providence have conceded to the beast.
The animals have natural means of
safety and protection; natural coverings to
ward off frost and cold; natural armor to
forestall and prevent attack by their ferocious competitors. In one sense, the animal
has a natural community with others of his
kind. But first and foremost, the animal is
self-sufficient and an aid to himself.
Man, on the other hand, is completely
different. He alone is fragile, weak, needy,
ill, destitute of help, bare, and possesses a
life filled with miseries. Men are not wanderers; neither can they live in solitude. If
they do, they do so at their peril. The imperatives of bare necessity would appear to
counsel that men, so similarly situated,
should band together into some form of
community experience. This tentative conclusion is further re-enforced by recalling
that man, though possessed of intelligence,
is not competent to know what is necessary
for his well-being. He needs both instruction and experience. Man's power of
speech is the vehicle of both and can be
exercised only in the fellowship of other
men. Furthermore, the human intelligence
itself cannot be developed in solitude or in
a vagrant life. Even granting that it could
and that the highest quality of intelligence,
wisdom, could be gained by man alone, this
perfection would be unpleasing and unsociable.
It was, remarks Vitoria, -for all these
reasons that Aristotle had said that man is
naturally civil, inclined to and competent
for societal living (sociabilis). But still other
considerations may and must be brought
to bear upon any examination of the condition of mankind. Man's will is perfected

when it attains justice and friendship.
Neither of these could be achieved outside
of the consortium of other men. Human
virtue, itself, develops only in a climate of
friendship. Hence, where there is no communication of man with man, human life
perishes. And if it did not die, it would not
and could not develop.
If now one pauses to reflect on the
thread of Vitoria's argument, he will note
that the discussion is carried on at several
levels of inquiry. Vitoria first compares two
sets of stubborn facts: the natural condition of animals and men, and the needs and
capacities of mankind. His survey takes
into account what may be necessary to
preserve and guarantee the bare existence
of human beings, and proceeds to take
account of what may be necessary for the
exercise of powers which are native and
specific to human beings as such. At each
level, he finds that neither existence nor
perfection can take place except in consortium with others of his kind. In effect,
neither a wandering life nor a solitary existence is conducive to man's welfare.
The line of discourse so far examined
leads to the conclusion that individual men
and mankind taken as a whole have the
need, capacity, and inclination to band
together. By their condition, by their competencies, and by their nature, men are
capable of entering into the fellowship of
others. Given, further, the necessity each
one has of preserving 4iimself and perfecting himself, it is necessary to seek the most
primitive means at hand to accomplish
these fundamental purposes.
Again, it should be noticed that Vitoria's
16
argument implies that men really exist.
16 This paragraph represents an interpretation of
Vitoria's thought which I believe to be implicit
in the text.

6
They are actual. Since this fact is present
and ineluctable, a transposition takes place
in the meaning of his discourse. Given the
need and given the capacity, the fact of
real existence brings into existence also
a multiple set of real relationships between
every living human being. Each man is
related to others insofar as his existence is
concerned. They and they alone can assist
him in preserving it. The store of human
knowledge and experience which other men
possess is related to man's intelligence and
his need to know. And the bare fact that
other men exist in the company of their
kind provides an objective situation wherein
the development of human intelligence and
human virtue can occur.
These relationships are real in the sense
that no mind constructs them. They are
given precisely as real owing to the capacities and the fact of existing persons.Since this is so, there appears before us
the spectacle of a rudimentary society of
mankind which is brought into existence
owing to objective facts. No agreement has
occurred; no legislation has taken place; no
consent has been given or received. The
basic ingredients of society are there, and
need only be brought to the point of exercise for further developments to take
place."7
The Function and Meaning of
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pation with the evidence adduced was to
arrive at a point where he could deal with
the meaning and legitimacy of the public
power of the state.18
Granted that a battery of human needs
and capacities exist, he proceeds to consider how the state itself is justified. This
justification Vitoria finds quite easily in the
fact that the human race cannot, if left in
a kind of embryonic form of society, preserve and protect itself. Complete security
cannot, always be had by the individual or,
even, by the family unit.1 9 Assuming, then,
that the composite end can be achieved
only in a stable, organized group, it is
necessarily concluded that "the state" is
needed for the attainment of specific human
ends.
The purposes enumerated justify the
formation of the state. Indeed, they make
it necessary. Since the primitive condition
of men and of mankind is the result of
man's nature and capacities, and since
these in turn are the result of the work of
nature, it must be concluded that the
"state" is naturally necessary. Viewing the
logic of Vitoria's doctrine at this point from
a dynamic outlook, one may conclude that
the formation of the state represents an
obligation upon the human race as such
and upon each person individually. In this
case, the obligation arises for the state as

Public Power
Some time has been spent in developing
the preceding section in order to emphasize
Vitoria's view that there is a universal
society of mankind. Yet, his own preoccuwill be noted that the general situation described above obtains everywhere and among all
men whatever. In this sense, the fellowship of
man with man, human consortium as such, is
absolutely universal. It is also real in the sense
described.
17 It

18 Our word "state" does not really translate Vitoria's usual term for the civil-political community, respublica.The latter for him would mean any
community whether independent or dependent,
perfect or imperfect. "Public power" is defined as
"the moral faculty, authority, or right to govern
a civil state." See GETINO 189.
19 In his purely political writings, Vitoria does
not appear to make much of the position of the
family. But see Matrimony, in GETINO, where he
cites with approval the statement of Aristotle that
man is a "conjugal animal" before he is a political
animal.
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a means to an end.
Passing now from this step, Vitoria discusses further the need which any state has
20
of central administration and direction.
Since, obviously, each such state would
consist of individual persons, it would
ordinarily happen that each one would seek
his own good or his own interest. If, by
hypothesis, every person in the state were
to do this, there would be no one at all who
would continuously see to the common purpose or good of the organized community.
Clearly, such a situation would make the
state totally ineffective and would even
negate the very idea of an organized community. Since, then, the state is needed for
the attainment of certain human ends
otherwise unattainable, and since the state
by definition is an organized human group,
it possesses of itself the power to govern
and administer itself in view of the ends
which are at once its cause and justification.
Again, assuming a dynamic point of
view, it must be remembered that the power
of the state (however made concrete) will
have to deal with human beings, all of
whom are possessed of intelligence and
will, each having his own private ideas and
his personal power of choice. It is these
human beings who privately and in common
are to be directed toward securing the
purposes which called the state into existence in the first place. For these reasons,
public power cannot remain simple physical compulsion, though this may be involved. It must mean, essentially, an act of
direction toward a goal. Implied in this
notion is the further idea that public power

Vitoria treats the question of the origin of
public power and its locus in GETINO 179, 181-82,
185.
20

must represent a moral power which is
sufficient to compel the adherence of human
beings. Public power, for Vitoria, is not
solely a physical force (though this is included); it is an active capacity which can
direct, manage, and administer the community with a view to the community's
fundamental purposes.
Public power, in this sense, is a property
of the human community as organized into
a state. It does not come from "outside" so
to speak. It is not the personal and subjective attribute of any individual person
or group of persons. Further, this power
exists and is justified solely for certain
purposes, all of which may be inferred from
the human need of community living and
from the necessary characteristics of the
bare idea of an organized society of human
beings who are organized to achieve human
purposes.
The "locus" of public power is, therefore, the state itself.2 1 It belongs to all the
members precisely because they are organized, and only in so far as they are organized. Or, to be yet more exact, public
power inheres in the human community in
so far as it is organized to obtain the
common good of the community as such.
Looking at the situation this way, one tends
naturally to think of the next step which
would be the relationship and place of
forms of government or the person or persons who head the state.

21 It may be noted that the "place?' where the
civil power resides is discussed under the heading
of the material cause of the state. "The material
cause wherein this power [i.e., the public power]
resides by the natural and divine law is the state
itself. For to it naturally belongs the prerogative
of governing itself, administering itself, and directing all its powers to the common good. On the
Civil Power in GETINO 181-82 (transl. by the

author).

6
In Vitoria's time, of course, he was most
familiar with monarchical forms and with
dynasties which had obtained their position by the exercise of hereditary rights,
war, marriage, etc. He was acquainted, too,
with republican forms of government, such
as obtained in the Venice of his time. One
cannot help noting, however, that forms of
government did not represent any specialized problem for him. All that were legitimate held and exercised the public power
of their respective states.
Fundamentally, then, the problem of a
community's choice of a form of government and the selection of the governing
persons is self-identical irrespective of
form. Later political theory saw this question as one of the delegation, translation
of power and authority, or designation.
Vitoria's handling of it deserves special
attention.
Public power, as we observed, is a property of the state as such. It resides in the
state. In a sense, it is totally immanent,
since this power is possessed by the community as a community for the attainment
of the community's indigenous purpose. In
quite another sense, public power transcends the community,, because the community exists for the sole purpose of obtaining personal, human goods of individual human beings. Now, no single individual possesses this public or community power in his own right. There is no evidence that he does or can. He does riot
possess it as a native right before entering into the community or apart therefrom.
Hence, there is no reason to suppose that a
prescribed individual would obtain it as a
subjective right merely because he enters
into or belongs to the community. Furthermore, each individual person possesses the
right of legitimate self-defense. This right
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would preclude anyone's obtaining public
power in a lawful way by force. By inference, then, it is held by Vitoria that the
consent of the community is necessary for
the constitution of public power in a specified form or in a specific person (or groups
of persons).22

Vitoria's language, at this point, implies
that the community as a whole "commits"
its power to a particular kind of government or to a particular person. A ruler is
"created" by the community. 23 In other
words, when one arrives at the point where
he questions the exercise of the inherent
power of the community, Vitoria states that
the community commits the authority to
exercise its power to a government. This
"commitment" or "commission" is not a
delegation so much as the creation of an
organ for the exercise of power. The community delegates its authority to the government. Once this delegation has taken
place, the government possesses the
authority of the state, and through this
authority may be said to possess the power
itself. Since, however, the power of the state
is natural in its end and origin, it is of God.
And for this reason, it may be said that the
power of a government (for example, a
king) is from God, and that the government
is the representative of God.
Two important notes may be added to
this section. First, Vitoria holds that the
king is subject to the laws of the state even
though he, himself, stands in the position of
approving them. It appears to him unthinkable that he should not be, since he - like
24
all others - is a member of the state.
22 GETINO
23 GETINO

182.
187.

24 For a more extended treatment of the ruler as
as member of the state, see text accompanying
note 35 infra.
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Second, every person in the state retains the
right to choose the form of government desired and the person desired, and this right
may be exercised by the greater part (major
25
pars) of the community.
Vitoria's majoritarian principle is important not only for the use made of it within
the state, but, as shall be noted later, within
the world community. In his eyes, the common good of the state must be seen to in
a consistent, orderly way. This need implies
that a political principle must be at hand
to resolve differences which may exist. Since
this is so, he argues that the "greater part"
should prevail over the "lesser part." It is
impractical to assume that all persons in
a given community will agree on everything.
Hence, it is necessary - given the need for
preserving and forwarding the common
good - that the many should triumph over
the few. Or, in any case, why hold that a
smaller number is more necessary for the
adoption of a public measure than a larger
number?
In effect, then, the Vitorian state is an
institution, the necessity of which is justified by the common necessities of mankind.
Its function is to subserve common ends. In
structure, it will be composed of persons
(members or citizens) and a government.
Its power is institutional in the sense that
the community as such possesses it. A specific form of government is chosen by the
members. This choice amounts to a "commission" of authority to exercise the public

It does not appear that Vitoria looked upon the
"greater part" (major pars) as anything more
than a numerically greater part of any given
group. There is no hint that it is the "better" part.
25

See CASASSA, THE POLrIcAL THOUGHT OF FRAN-

CISCO DE VrToRiA 115-16 (1946) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation in University of Toronto Library).

power. Hence, government is an organ of
the state. A king, though chosen by a majority, is king of the whole community, and
not simply of those who chose him. In functioning, the ruler or government acts for
the state, and his single purpose is the administration and direction of the community
and of all powers within the community to
the common good.
The Fact and Origin of a Multiplicity
of States
It must be emphasized that "the state,"
as Vitoria discusses it, nowhere exists. Or
rather, it existed in a multiple form. There
was a plurality of states, some of them independent, some of them dependent on others.
With this fact, we have now to deal.
At the outset, one may notice that Vitoria
dismissed any possible pretensions of the
Holy Roman Emperor as "lord of the
world." This position was not Vitoria's
alone; it may be found in most theological
writers of the century. With this emotional
and political myth dispelled, he is free to
come to terms with the political organization
of Europe as he knew it.
Throughout his writings, there are three
types-of questions discussed, all of which
show his final appraisal of the validity of
the multiple system of states. First, in his
examination of the questions of war, he is
called upon to say which European states
have the right to carry on offensive warfare.
Second, his confrontation with the moral
question of Spanish rights in the New World
brings to bear his judgment upon the relationship of European governments and peoples with the "barbaric" peoples and governments of the newly discovered Americas.
Third, now and again in his writing, he expresses his attitude toward the "infidels,"
that is, all of those peoples labelled in his
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time as Saracens or Mohammedans. These
cases may be examined singly.
When discussing warfare, Vitoria holds,
along with most of his contemporaries, that
only the head of a perfect and independent
society may justly declare and carry on
offensive warfare.2 6 This right he would concede without cavil to his native Spain, to
France, the Holy Roman Empire, England,
Portugal, the Republic of Venice, and to
certain independent Italian communes, such
as Ferrara. With respect, however, to the
same general question, he would in ordinary
circumstances deny this right to dependent
states, etc., like Flanders, the Duchy of
Alba, etc. Yet, in grave necessity (when
serious danger exists and if the lord of these
subordinate states is delinquent), Vitoria
would not and did not hesitate to say that
even these "imperfect" communities could
and should undertake offensive war.2 7 And
the reason he gives is that their subjection
to other princes is the result of some positive law or due to the jus gentium. In other
words, the vassal states retain a right which
positive law cannot take away.
So far, then, as this point is concerned,
we may conclude that every organized community of Vitoria's time possessed in some
measure or other the character, powers,
and prerogatives of "the state."
When we pass to an examination of the
Spanish question, an entirely different problem is raised. Though the Spaniards had
"discovered" the Americas in 1492 and
through the ensuing years had conquered
native rulers, such as the princes of Mexico
and Peru, the moral protests against the activity of the Spanish State had not died down
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even by Vitoria's time. For his part, Vitoria
was to carry on one of the most celebrated
28
protests against it.
He viewed the situation in moral terms,
as he explicitly says. But it is important to
notice briefly the general framework within
which the controversy was carried on. On
the one side was a highly civilized people
organized under a capable and efficient government. On the other was a conglomeration of native peoples and races, organized
in varying degrees of political efficiency and
sophistication. Futhermore, the "Indians"
were infidels. Much was made in the controversy of all the elements in this picture.
Thus, it was said that the native did not
and could not own property; or it was
claimed that, owing to their lack of development, they were natural slaves. Again, the
argument was advanced that their unbelief
meant that they could neither own property
nor possess legitimate political power.
Finally, some of the protagonists of the
Spanish cause argued that for humanitarian
reasons the barbarians should be brought
under the hegemony of a civilized power,
by arms if necessary.
To all of these arguments, Vitoria replied
with a stem and unrelenting denial. Irrespective of faith, spiritual condition, or degree of civilization, the natives were true
owners of their possessions and their princes
were legitimate rulers. He dismissed the
Spanish claims as immoral, erroneous, or
mere subterfuges. 29 By so doing, Vitoria
2

8The Spanish Dominican wrote two famous
works on the "Indies" question: (1) First Relection on the Indians (De Indis), and (2) On the
Right of War (De jure belli Hispanorum in bar-

baros). It is these two treatises which are translated in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW No. 7

26 See On the Right of War (De fure belli) in

GETINO 394 et. seq.
27 See GETINO 396-97, where Vitoria discusses
the right of the vassal states.

(Carnegie Endowment, 1917). Both are contained
in GETINO.
29 See On the Indians (De Indis) in GETINO 31154, for a discussion of illegitimate titles for Spanish claims.
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established the important point that nonEuropean and non-Christian peoples may
be true owners of property and may enjoy
a valid political organization. His stand
meant, in short, that the possessions and
political power of the natives had been unjustly and unlawfully expropriated by the
Spanish.
Still in connection with the New World
question, Vitoria proceeds to examine the
legal relationship which did obtain between
all of them and the Spanish crown. No common legal system, he remarks, governed the
natives and the Europeans. Hence, all relationships must be governed by the divine
law, the natural law, and the jus gentium. 30
In a famous passage, he proceeds to state
those affirmative relationships which do
exist and in violation of which a state of
31
war might be justified.
The primary and governing relationship
is called "a title of natural society and
communication." Under this head, says
Vitoria, the Spanish have the right to travel
to those distant lands and to dwell there,
provided, of course, no harm is intended or
brought upon the natives. Nor may the Indians prohibit them in these forms of intercourse. This prime title and the inferred
right are justified by an imposing array of
fourteen distinct arguments.
Though these lines of thought have
their own interest, they may be summarized
in briefer form here. First, the right of
travel and dwelling arises from the jus
gentium. Among all nations (nationes), it
has been regarded as inhuman to refuse to
receive guests and travelers without some

The Vitorian theory of the jus gentium will be
discussed at greater length. See text accompanying note 37 infra.
31 What Vitoria believes to be legitimate titles are
found in GETINO at 357-80.
30

special cause. Again, from the very beginning of the world (when all things were
common), it was permissible for a person
to go to any region he wished. Nor, says
Vitoria, does it appear that this basic right
was removed by the subsequent division of
the human race into different groups living
in different parts of the world. In fact, to
prohibit such journeying in the time of the
division would have been inhuman. It could
not have been the intention of the primitive peoples to prohibit friendly travel by
the division of the peoples. Exclusion
amounts to exile (a capital punishment)
and can be interpreted as a warlike act.
Friendship, itself, is a natural right. Furthermore, by the natural law, all things are
common: flowing water, the sea, rivers,
ports (where by the jus gentium all ships
may put in).
Proceeding beyond the generality of natural society and the right to travel, Vitoria
next remarks that the Spanish have the right
to conduct business with the natives, provided no injury is caused. They may bring
goods to the New World and exchange them
for materials which are there abundant:
gold, silver, and the like. Such human communication cannot be forbidden by the native princes; nor, on the other ,hand, may
the Spanish kings prohibit their subjects
from carrying on trade. This right of trading
arises, also, from the jus gentium, provided
no harm is intended or inflicted. The law
in question would hold also between civilized states (e.g., Spain and France).
Taking still another step, Vitoria remarks
that if any possessions or privileges are already common to the natives themselves
and to "guests," it would be forbidden for
the Indians to exclude the Spanish. Thus,
for example, if it were permissible for all
non-natives to mine gold in common fields
or in rivers, and if they are allowed to search
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for pearls in the sea or in rivers, these same
privileges could not be forbidden to the
Spaniards. In precisely the same way that
all foreigners are received, so must the
Spanish. Guests must respect the rights of
the native peoples, but the latter cannot
make a particular exclusion of Spain. The
right to travel implies the right to equal
treatment with other travelers. Again, an
object belonging to no one comes into the
possession of the person or persons "occupying" it. No one by supposition owns
such common areas as lands, rivers and
seas. Hence, any discoverer may claim
whatever is found there. The rights implied
in discovery are either of the natural law
or of the jus gentium (in turn, derived from
the natural law and established by the consent of the greater part of the whole world
for the common good of all).
Finally, if any Spaniard were born in the
New World as a free man, there could be
no reason for denying him citizenship or the
privileges of other citizens. Vitoria supposes
in this argument that the native born Spaniard is the child of Spaniards who have
settled in a native state.3 2 Citizenship, he
continues, follows birth according to the
jus gentium, and this statement is confirmed
by recalling that, since man is an animal
civile, he is a member of the state in which
he is born and of any other. If he is not a
citizen of the state of his birth, he cannot
be a member of another. And without any
citizenship at all, he would be excluded
from rights which are his by the natural law
and the jus gentium.
It should not escape our notice that
Vitoria has excluded from his consideration
all mention of a common system of posiThis application of the jus soli raises the very
interesting question of what juridical position
32
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tive law, except the jus gentium. In effect,
he is saying that even when a system of law
is absent, one is not at a loss to explain the
relationships of peoples as diverse as the
Spaniards,. the French, and the varying
kinds of political organization (or the lack
of it) in the New World. His reliance on
the arguments here advanced is threefold:
(1) 6n the natural law, (2) the natural society of mankind, (3) the jus gentium
(which he has stated springs from the natural law by the determination by consent
of the greater part of the human race for
the common good of all).
The question of the Saracens may be dismissed quickly. To Vitoria, as to most
writers of the era, they were "the perpetual
foe." Their position was one that had been
arrived at by unjust warfare, rapine, and
theft. Saracen rulers were tyrants and, de
jure, could not be considered as true rulers.
More important, they were considered so
immoral that no treaty of peace could with
any safety be negotiated. So far, then, as
they were concerned, the relationships between Europeans and Saracens were governed by the divine law, the natural law,
and the jus gentium. But, so far as the latter
was concerned, the law of war was all that
was actually required. It should be noted
that, for Vitoria, the Saracens were without
a just form of government. Hence, there
were no legitimate states or state. They
were simply warlike families, peoples, or
tribes.
A careful reading of these three concrete
situations makes clear the part played in Vitoria's thought by the allied concepts of
"natural society," and the jus gentium. So
far as the first idea is concerned, it appears
to be clear that the natural society and communication of men is absolutely primary
and the root of a system of law, the latter
being the jus gentium.
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Here we may note an historical factor
which is heavily emphasized in all of Vitoria's thought. This is the fact and conception of a primitive division of mankind. 33
Aside from any valid philosophical or theological explanation of the common origin
of mankind, the Spanish Dominican relies
on the evidence of the Scripture to account
for the fact that the human race, though
sprung from common ancestors, has been
historically divided into various families,
races, nations, states, and governments.
In his eyes, the Scripture shows that after
the Flood, the human race was divided,
probably on a family by family basis, each
settling in a different region of the world.
The division was made necessary or justified
by the safety and peace of the race. He is
uncertain as to whether the decision to divide was made by Noah (sending different
families to settle in different areas) or, more
probably, by a mutual consent of the peoples (gentes) involved. In either case, he
takes the division to be a fact. And from
the historical division, there has arisen,
either by an act of tyranny or by consent,
various states and governments. For Vitoria, the fact of a division is clear and decisive. It was a voluntary splitting of the race
into family groups in different territories
and explained the temporal origin of states
and governments.
The point being made here is that mankind actually existed as one at a certain
point in time. For the betterment of the
race, a rational choice intervened. A purely
natural position of the race was disturbed.
The division was required for the conservation of mankind. In the face of this neces-

This primitive division of mankind into different families is dealt with in many places. See On
33

the Civil Power (De potestate civili) in GETnNO
179; see also GETiNO 317-19.

sity, an obligation arose. The objective situation founded the right to divide. And
since this right was not natural (that is,
being brought in by nature herself), it must
be considered as one possessed and exercised by existing persons. All living at that
time cooperated in the decision or abided
by it. Hence, the division took place under
the jus gentium.
Universal Society and the
Role of States
It will be apparent that the pursuit of
Vitoria's thought has introduced us to a
most complex theoretical situation. On the
one hand, he has presented the human race
as an existing society, one that possesses a
common purpose or common good and endowed with specific juridical powers. On
the other hand, he has emphasized the
legitimacy of the state and the civil power
of the state. With respect to civil power, he
has pointed out the organic relationship of
public power to the whole community, and
stressed the prerogatives of the "greater
part" in choosing a form of government and
the actual "rulers." Complicating the picture still more, the Spaniard has brought
out clearly the fact of a plurality of states,
all with the same function and constitution.
To some extent, he has defined the legal relationship of state with state by a double
stress on: (1) the natural society of the
race, and (2) the jus gentium. In effect, his
position comes down to this: the existence
and juridical position of the human race, as
such, can never be completely disregarded
in any consideration of the relationships of
state with state.
When one adopts the Vitorian position,
emphasizing as it does the universal society
of mankind, his view of inter-state relations
changes radically.
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This general thesis can be reviewed now
in the light of five other Vitorian themes
which relate specifically to the twofold relationship which each state has: (1) with
other states, and (2) with the universal society of men.
First, Vitoria considers a situation involving a question of justifiable warfare. Suppose, he says, that France has inflicted a
wrong on Spain. Suppose, too, that the
Spanish have made remonstrances, but in
vain. 34 War would appear to be the only
means of redress open to the Spanish. There
would be a just cause. Ordinarily one might
assume that the moral questions in this
hypothetical situation were closed. But Vitoria points out that there is yet another
dimension to the question of whether Spain
may exercise her right to reparations by
war. If, says he, it becomes clear that the
war would bring harm to the whole of
Christendom or to the "whole world," that
war would become, by the very fact of a
prospective greater injury, completely unjust. And one must note he does not say
that such warfare would be a failing in
friendship or charity. It would be, ipso
facto, unjust. A subordination of goods and
rights is present even where it would appear
that the legitimate interest of a single state
apparently indicates a mandatory course of
action.
Second, Vitoria considers a situation
where an individual state may wish to alter
not only its regime but the very form of
government. As has been noticed, he would
permit such a change by the consent of the
"greater part" of the citizenry. He, then,
takes a further step. Supposing that the
"whole world" wished to choose one uni-

34 On the Civil Power (De potestate civili) in
GETINO 192.
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versal monarch, would such an act be permissible and what degree of consent would
be required? Vitoria's general reply is in
the affirmative. And the reason given is
that the whole human race once possessed
this power, and it is inconceivable that the
power was ever lost. Coming, then, to the
question of consent, he simply replies that
the majority consent of all peoples would
suffice. And if such consent by the majority
were given, the monarch so chosen would
be the "lord of all," and all would be sub35
ject to him.
Third, there is question of what we would
call the "intervention in the internal affairs"
of another state. If a particular state or people were burdened with a tyrannical ruler
or regime, and if it were clear that oppression were taking place, the innocent killed
or subjected to immoral rites, laws, or practices, it would, says Vitoria, be the obligation of "princes" to intervene and overthrow
the tyrant. And the reason given is that the
"whole world" has committed its power to
rulers.3 6 This power can be exercised only
through them. In other words, an obligation lies upon all "princes" to act as organs
of the race.
Fourth, when Vitoria examines the question of whether a monarch is subject "to his
own laws," he takes the position that he is.
If the monarch's consent is required for the
"passing" of a law, the consent may be given
or withheld. But once given, the law is valid.
It is a law of the state and brought into
being by the power (potestas) of the whole
community of which the monarch is and
remains a member. As a corollary to this
position, he notes that the jus gentium is a

35 GETINO 192-95.
36 See On the Right of War (De jure belli) in
GETINO 403-04, for a discussion of the obligation
of rulers to act on behalf of the "whole world."

VITORIA'S UNIVERSALISM

true law (or complex of laws) and passed
by the authority of the "whole world." A
consent of the majority suffices for the validity of any law belonging to the jus gentium. If, then, an individual state consents
to a particular law, its consent is irrevocably
binding. And, under the majoritarian principle, the state is bound anyway, since what
the majority consents to is held to have the
consent of all. No state may exempt itself
37
from the jus gentium.
Fifth, it will be clear that the theory of
the "greater part" plays a decisive role in
Vitorian political theory. It is used both
within the state and within the international
community. So far as "state sovereignty" is
concerned, the right of the whole of human
society or of a majority enjoys a primacy of
any kind of sovereignty, irrespective of definition. An intrinsic limitation is imposed on
each and every individual state.
These five aspects of Vitorian theory
point clearly to a situation wherein the
moral and legal position of any individual
state is severely limited. In effect, it does not
do to say that "the state" is self-sufficient or
sovereign. Both adjectives may correctly be
applied to "the state" or to any individual
state, but neither may be simply predicated
without qualification. What they assert is
true, but what - during the course of history - they have come to deny is false.
Both terms are justified solely in terms
of a purpose or a set of purposes. If it is
assumed that the justifying purpose is exclusive, it will also be assumed that it is
limited. By inference, an exclusion has been
made which, at least in Vitorian theory,
cannot be tolerated. The purpose or
common good of an individual state is, at

207. It should be noted that the major
pars does not determine matters of intrinsic or
basic morality.
37 GETINO

bottom, one with the general end of human
society as such. Since this is so, the intrinsic
powers of the individual state (while sufficient for it) are still justified only by the
one, single common good of all mankind.
Vitoria's devotion to the common end of
the race and the limitations imposed on
each member of the multiple system is
shown in his restriction of the right of war.
And it may be argued very persuasively that
Vitoria would allow warfare only as a function of the common good of mankind. In
this case, an individual state which takes up
arms does so on behalf of and as an organ
of the whole human society. The "organic"
role of warfare is illustrated by his stand
that the power (potestas) of the whole
world is and has been committed to rulers.
Finally, the Vitorian view of war grows
out of the basic view that the "whole world"
retains a fundamental political right which
is never lost, and which could be activated
by the choice of the "greater part" of the
race. This exercise could take the form of
a majority selection of a universal and
common government. Actually, however,
Vitoria held that majority choice has been
shown by the existence of the jus gentium,
giving the world a body of law which binds
all alike and to which all (individual states
included) are subject.
The Jus Gentium
Much has been made in the foregoing
pages of Vitoria's position on the historic
concept of the jus gentium. This emphasis
coincides with a certain stress laid in our
time on the great Spaniard's position as one
of the "founders" of international law.
Sharp differences of opinion exist regarding
Vitoria's position. Into none of these will
this paper enter. What seems important,
however, is to survey the principal points
which he does make.

6
It will be remembered that for Vitoria the
jus gentium represents a source of true law
and that this law is "passed" by the authority of the "whole world." In this usage,
"whole" can mean either all persons living
in the world, or it can mean a "greater part"
of them. Either suffices for the validity of a
law passed de jure gentium. Under the majoritarian principle, a greater part can act
for all, and their action is valid. Furthermore, these laws bind and it would be a
serious moral fault to violate one if the
matter were of serious import.
As one would expect, Vitoria consistently
compares the jus gentium with competing
forms of right (jus) or law: divine, natural,
or positive law. To make this distinction
come out, it may be well to examine a list
of those items which Vitoria says are de jure
gentium.
For the sake of convenience, these may
be separated into several classes. First, we
may consider those rights (and laws) which
38
arise out of the natural society of mankind.
This society is natural, but specific kinds of
communication, travel, commerce, contracts, hospitality, asylum and the like
would arise de jure gentium. Second, there
arises a series of rights which result from
a culpable violation of any of the rights
which have their source in the 'jus gentium:
declaration of an offensive war, reception
and immunity of legates, enslavement of
captives, capture of movable goods, deposition of the enemy government and occupation of a hostile country. 39 Third, one might
consider forms of ownership and jurisdiction. The right to own material possessions
is a natural right, but actual dominion arises
de jure gentium.40 Likewise, nonfamilial
38 On the Indians (De Indis) in GETiNO 357-63.
39 GETIN O 381-438.
40 See

GETINO

316, where Vitoria cites Saint
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types of jurisdiction arise from the jus
gentium, though the basic right to create or
acquire jurisdiction is of the natural law.
Finally, the right of citizenship in the land
of one's birth is had by both .the natural law
and the jus gentium.
It will be noticed that in each example
4
some situation of natural right is involved. '
Thus, to look briefly at the question of dominion over material possessions, we may
observe that mankind's relationship to the
goods of the earth is natural. Land, the fruit
of the earth, food, shelter, etc., are related
to man's necessities and satisfactions. A
natural relationship or proportion exists
here. But how is one to explain that the
private dominion of one man over a particular part of the earth's goods is justified?
Per se, a simple participation in the fruits
of the earth should suffice. At this point
another natural need enters the picture.
Mankind must live in peace and without
contention, and each person must have a
real interest in his own livelihood.
In this situation, therefore, there are
three terms to be considered: (1) man or
mankind, (2) the goods of the earth, and
(3) peaceful living. The relationship between the first two terms is natural. However, the relationship of the first two to the
third is not natural (in the sense of being
logically necessary). Yet, peace is necessary for mankind. In this sense, peace is
just and rightful. When, therefore, it is foreseen and agreed that the primitive relationship between mankind and the goods of the
earth involve the creation and preservation
of peace, some constructive action with re-

Thomas on the relationship of the dominium to
the jus gentium.

41 An extensive analysis of the relationship of the
jus gentium to the natural law is found in VrrouA,
COMMENTARY ON TIE SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-Il.
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spect to the original relationship is justified.
Historically, mankind has in fact agreed
that a division of the goods of the earth is
necessary and conducive to the preservation of peace. Since, then, the actual division arose as the fruit of human perception
and choice (but in view of peace, to which
mankind had a right), this division is said
to be de jure gentium.
Transposing this explanation into more
technical terms, Vitoria would say that
man's relationship to earthly goods is natural and necessary or that the commensuration between these two terms is natural.
He would say, further, that the relation of
mankind to peace is also natural. But he
would claim that the commensuration between mankind and the "world-as-divided"
is justified only because of peace. A human
need and purpose which is legitimate and
necessary (peace) was seen to have a relationship to the particular mode of use
made of the earth's goods.
This example contains the kernel of his
philosophical theory of the jus gentium. The
sending of legates is not, per se, necessary
to the welfare of man. Yet, they become
necessary owing to the need there is of preserving peace, friendly relations, and communication. Since these latter items are
necessary, it is, by inference, necessary that
legates be immune from slaughter or capture. Likewise, purely defensive war is necessary and justified for self-preservation. But
simply repelling an enemy is neither peace
nor a guarantee of peace. Recovery of
goods, punishment of the enemy, occupation of his country, the weakening of his
power to attack and all other phases of
offensive warfare are needed for peace in
any full and lasting sense. Hence, the declaration of offensive war is justified by reason
of securing peace (which, in this case, is an
extension of the notion of self-defense).

In effect, then, Vitoria's notion of the jus
gentium, though closely related to the natural law, is not the natural law. It is positive law. And the reason it is positive law is
twofold: ( 1) it deals with matters which are
not formally brought in by nature and,
therefore, not absolutely necessary; (2) it
supposes that human intelligence has perceived a relationship to a third term (for
example, peace) and that human beings
have agreed and consented that this third
term requires and justifies some act, institution, or mode of behavior. The jus gentium
is, therefore, human or man-made law.
Provisions of the jus gentium are either
written or unwritten. But irrespective of the
form, all have the intrinsic character noted
above. Furthermore, the apprehension of
the necessity and the consent necessary is
had by all of the human race or by a greater
part of it. Such consent could be given in
a common meeting or congress, if such
were possible. In the absence of a universal
congress, this consent can be evidenced by
the customs and sentiments of mankind.
When it can be shown that mankind has,
indeed, agreed upon some particular provision, then Vitoria would hold that this is
a true positive law. It would provide a norm
of action for human behavior. Its purpose
would be discernible. The fact that a particular provision is widely supported argues
to consent. And, since mankind constitutes
a universal society, it may take those steps
necessary for its common or universal welfare. It has the right (jus) to make a law
42
(jus/lex).
Historical Reflections on
Vitoria's Universalism
It will be evident that there is little room
in Vitoria for many of the preoccupations
42

In this sense, Vitoria claims that the jus gentium
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of contemporary legal and political practice.
If we return to the conception of the study
of ideas as a laboratory where hard experience tests the validity of theory and thought,
it will be found that our examination will
find much difficulty with the statecraft of
the modern world.
Why, for example, does Vitoria have so
little difficulty in adjusting the relative position of the state? How does one explain
the ready confidence with which the Spanish Dominican explains the status of the
whole of mankind in view of political relationships? By what means does he face
the question of the position of the ruler with
respect to the whole state? Even though
Vitoria's theory rests upon an organic conception of the state and the world, what
prevents him from falling into a position
where the state becomes a Leviathan? From
what source arises his sureness of touch in
dealing with the independence of the state
and at the same time refusing to see in the
state an entity which is "sovereign"? Or,
finally, why, as a matter of fact, does he
refuse to discuss sovereignty at all?
To heighten somewhat the historical contrast between the Vitorian position and
modern thought, one may turn quickly to
review a few critical questions which arrest
so powerfully the attention of contemporary
jurists.
1. Is the individual state, as such, the
sole framer of the provisions of international law? For Vitoria, the answer must be
in the negative. In his teachings, there does
not appear to be any absolutely necessary
43
role which the individual state must play.

is a true law "passed" or "made" by the authority
of the whole world.
43 It is-only fair to remark that competent interpreters of Vitoria disagree on the organic nature

of the international community.
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He does not see human society as broken
up into a discrete set of atomized communities which must be bound together with the
slender thread of transient pacts and agreements.
2. Would states, then, be bound by an
international law conceived after the manner of the jus gentium? Yes, they would.
Indeed, they would be bound whether each
had given its consent or whether it had not.
Underlying this thesis is the Vitorian conception that mankind itself constitutes a
basic society. Human persons or individuals
stand in relation to each other in important
and intimate ways. The family of mankind
possesses rights which are not simply legal,
as this term is understood in our time. If a
majority of the people composing the race
should consent, this consent creates a law.
And the law in turn binds all. What is done
by and for the majority is done by and for
all.
3. Are states, then, equal? They are
and may be described as equal, provided
that one remembers that this "equality" indicates a relationship which obtains only
among and between states as such. One
must acknowledge that no individual state
is the "equal" of the whole of mankind.
4. Should states be considered as sovereign? Here the reply must be that they are
and they are not. The organized community
has a function which implies the right to
govern and direct its members to a human
end. In this sense, the state is sovereign.
But if sovereignty implies either that the
state possesses overriding rights with respect to the.personal rights of its own citizens, or if it means that its position is paramount in relation to the rights of the whole
race, then it is not sovereign.
Historical reflection makes plain that the
political struggles of modern times have
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reduced many themes of contemporary
jurisprudence to absurdity. What has been
the sad history of revolution against the
omnicompetent state? Why is it that personal, human rights have proved to be so
great a stumbling block to international
jurists? How is it that expressions like the
"family of nations" have such a hollow
ring?
When all is said and done, it would appear that a fundamental error lies at the
base of a great deal of the political thought
of the modern world. To state this error
crudely, one may say that it consists in
severing the rational and natural relationships which obtain between all persons
everywhere. Akin to this fault is a kindred
error in most philosophies of the state. This
consists in erasing the fundamental human
purpose of the state as a means to an end,
namely, the -promotion and securing of
human goods or values. Once this function
has disappeared, the state can become the
instrument of vicious ends, and when devoted to these, the interrelationship of state
with state vanishes.
At bottom, these types of errors may be
explained by saying that they are the fruits
of nominalism and voluntarism. Or, to put
the matter another way, they are the result
of the disappearance of an intellectualistic
outlook. Nominalism deals with powerful
concepts without grounding them in real
being. It manipulates terms precisely as
divorced from any real order. Thus "sovereignty" became a term which was, in point
of fact, unrelated to anything objective. It
became a slogan for naked power.
Since nominalism represented a kind of
inability to perceive relationships in the

order of reality,- it gave birth to a voluntarism in law and political thought. Essentially, legal voluntarism consists in an effort
to impose relations which are believed to be
non-existent. 4 4 This imposition takes place
by the will of a superior (either a ruler or a
system of law). And since human choice is
unlimited in itself and finds its guide or
limit from the intelligence, voluntarism,
since it enshrines the unlimited will, tends to
beget systems of thought which despise
rational restriction and order. The unlimited
will imposes an order which is artificial. Imposition is allied with compulsion and power,
and the voluntaristic state becomes the
power state.
Given, finally, a system of power states,
there is also given the proper spawning
ground of pure positive law and pure sovereignty. By their very nature, they imply no
intrinsic limit which would be imposed by
an intellectual perception of reality and of
order. And this is why Austin found any
limitation of "supreme power" a contradiction in terms. Given his premises, Austin
was completely correct.
But the poised assurance of Vitoria would
not concede the premises, based as they are
on the inept and crude terminism of eighteenth century empiricism. Vitoria illustrates
the tradition of reason. The fruit of his
thought shows in a striking way how superior this tradition is in dealing with human
affairs. And its secret lies in a profound but
stirring humility in the presence of the witness of nature.
44 A useful introduction to the question of the in-

fluence of voluntarism on legal thought may be
found in DAvrrT, THE NATURE OF LAW (1951).
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